Games can allow threats, binding or non-binding agreements, side payments, real and pretended restrictions, and real or false information {communication, games}. Communication can be free or restricted by rules. Rules and normal form have equal importance, depending on ability to communicate and cooperate. Games can allow shared rewards. Games can allow binding or non-binding agreements among communicating players. Agreements can be free or restricted by rules.
Arbitration {Nash arbitration scheme} can maximize player-utility product.
Arbitrators and bargainers try to find point at which both players are best off {Pareto optimum, games}. Typically, more than Pareto optimum exists.
Bargaining {bargaining, games} {negotiation, arbitration}, or using third party to determine outcome fairly {arbitration, negotiation}, makes outcome independent of utility function, as well as independent of allowing other outcomes. In cooperative games and bargaining, one player often dominates.
Games have acceptable-outcome sets {bargaining set}.
In bargaining, player can assume other player will maximize outcome {Bowley point}. Games with no repeated play and incomplete information often reach the Bowley point, instead of Pareto optimum.
Bargaining can find point where outcomes are equal for both players {equal profits point}.
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Date Modified: 2022.0225